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Abstract ― Before the introduction of the Euro many observers had expected an increase 
of inflationary pressures due to a de-coordination-shock to national wage bargaining. 
However, if anything systematically happened after the introduction of the Euro wage 
restraint increased (Posen and Gould 2006). A possible explanation for this finding is that a 
system of pattern bargaining has emerged with Germany figuring as a “centre of gravity” 
for European wage bargains (Traxler et al. 2008, Traxler and Brandl 2009). This paper 
studies wage and nominal unit labour cost spill-overs for the EMU for a panel over 13 
manufacturing sectors from 1992-2005 and quantifies the effects of different countries. It 
turns out that there are strong interdependencies across EMU-members with regard to 
nominal wage growth. Indeed, a leading role accrues to Germany whose wage 
developments are twice as influential as those of the next important countries. Remarkably, 
the strong interdependence of wage growth is not reflected with regard to unit labour costs. 
Here, only the development in a core group composed of Austria, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, is bound to each other. The development of nominal unit labour costs in other 
countries is largely independent from each other and especially from this core group. 
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The state of wage convergence in EMU 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Before the introduction of the Euro many observers had expected an increase of inflationary 
pressures due to a de-coordination-shock to national wage bargaining. However, if anything 
systematically happened after the introduction of the Euro wage restraint increased (Posen 
and Gould 2006). A possible explanation for this finding is that a system of pattern bargaining 
has emerged with Germany figuring as a “centre of gravity” for European wage bargains 
(Traxler et al. 2008, Traxler and Brandl 2009). This paper studies wage and nominal unit 
labour cost spill-overs for the EMU for a panel over 13 manufacturing sectors from 1992-
2005 and quantifies the effects of different countries. It turns out that there are strong 
interdependencies across EMU-members with regard to nominal wage growth. Indeed, a 
leading role accrues to Germany whose wage developments are twice as influential as those 
of the next important countries. Remarkably, the strong interdependence of wage growth is 
not reflected with regard to unit labour costs. Here, only the development in a core group 
composed of Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, is bound to each other. The 
development of nominal unit labour costs in other countries is largely independent from each 
other and especially from this core group.  
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Introduction 
 
The moderate rates of inflation in the Eurozone after the introduction of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) came as a major surprise to many observers (De Grauwe 2009). The 
broad and distinguished stream of literature on wage bargaining1
 
 almost unequivocally had 
predicted a substantial release of wage restraint after the introduction of the EMU. Wage 
bargaining systems that formerly where centralized at a national level where thought to be 
crushed to a size compared to the level of monetary policy where they still would be able to 
cause real effects but where they would be too small to internalize the negative externalities of 
their behaviour. However, if the EMU had any impact at all on wage setting behaviour, wage 
restraint increased (Posen and Gould 2006). What had happened? 
A possible explanation is that – contrary to common perception – the pressure of international 
product and labour market competition has led to a convergence of wages and to a multiple 
wage restraint scenario. This implies that the key date for wage convergence is not determined 
by the introduction of the common currency but by the loss of independent monetary policy as 
contained in the Maastricht treaty in 1992. This date marks the loss of the ability of national 
authorities to correct for ‘wrong’ wage developments by manipulation of the exchange rate. 
Starting from this consideration it is also possible to argue that with the unification of 
Germany – which created one overly dominant economy within the EMS – a key role might 
have accrued to German wage policies and their effect on unit labour cost developments 
acting as an implicit cost leader (Fitoussi et al. 1993). In the meantime Germany might even 
have become Germany the “centre of gravity” of European wage policies (Traxler et al. 2008, 
Traxler and Brandl 2009).  
                                                 
1 Key contributions include Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen (1998), Cukiermann and Lippi (2001), Soskice 
and Iversen (2001), Hanké and Soskice (2003), Hanké and Iversen (2003) and Coricelli et al. (2006). 
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Whether this really has happened on a broad scale in the internationally exposed sector of the 
economy is evaluated on the following pages. We take an in-depth-look at the different 
influences on wage setting in the EMU-members states during the period of the EMS and the 
early years of EMU in the manufacturing industry. Contrary to most available investigations 
this paper does not exclusively rely on aggregate data but uses a sectoral panel. This makes it 
possible to control for the direct effects between competing sectors of different countries. In 
particular it will be analysed how competitive pressures influence the process of wage growth 
across Europe. Further we undertake a first attempt to quantify the impact that wage accords 
of different countries have on trans-European wage growth.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First the theoretical arguments that 
underlie the empirical project will be briefly sketched out. Then an overview over the state of 
empirical research will be presented. Subsequently the sources and the availability of the data 
which forms the basis of the econometric section will be provided. Thereafter stylized facts 
the estimation method and the key independent variable – whose construction and 
investigation forms the major contribution of this research – will be discussed. Finally the 
discussion of the results is winded up by a concluding section.  
 
Wage Bargaining under the EURO: Theoretical Considerations 
 
The early discussion of the effects of wage bargaining coordination centred roughly around 
two dominating arguments. The corporatist hypothesis (Soskice 1990, Iversen 1999, Traxler 
2003) maintained that the higher the level of wage bargaining coordination is the stronger the 
implementation of potential negative externalities into the wage bargains becomes which 
implies a linearly beneficial relationship between the degree of wage bargaining coordination 
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and economic outcomes. This was disputed by the literature inspired by Calmfors and 
Driffill’s (1988) seminal contribution. This literature (Bleany 1996, Scarpetta 2006, 
Stockhammer and Onaran 2009) maintained that internalization only takes place at a very 
high level of aggregation while at a low level of aggregation firm-based unions are eager to 
prevent loses in their competitive position which prevents excessive wage claims.2
 
 At a 
medium level however the goods of the considered sectors no longer can be considered to be 
close substitutes (i.e. the cross price elasticities are extremely inelastic) which prevents 
competition to put a break on wage excesses. Still – the argument goes – the level of 
coordination is yet too small to lead to an internalization of negative externalities (such as 
high inflation and the according reactions of the central bank). The result is that a hump-
shaped relationship between the level of wage bargaining coordination and macroeconomic 
outcomes such as unemployment and inflation is stated.  
This discussion is mirrored in the literature on the effects of the EMU on wage bargaining 
coordination regimes. The two most important streams of literature3
                                                 
2 To fully understand the argument it might be useful bear in mind that a neoclassical labour market and a Stone-
Geary (that is, wage bill maximizing) utility function are central to the economic core of these models.  
 strongly reflect 
theoretical positions that already had been made in the discussion on the national effects of 
wage bargaining coordination systems throughout the early 1990ies. The first stream will be 
labelled transnational Calmfors-Driffill-hypothesis in the following. This literature (Hall and 
Franzese 1998, Cukiermann and Lippi 2001, Hanké and Soskice 2003) primarily focuses on 
the effects of the interaction between wage bargainers and central banks. The main argument 
is that the relatively high national levels of wage bargaining coordination will be persistent 
after the introduction of the EMU but degenerate to being only medium levels of coordination 
3 The general scope of the literature is slightly larger especially including Burda‘s (2001) proposition that wage 
bargaining systems might become atomized (or Americanized) after the introduction of the Euro. This argument 
however has found little support in the literature (see for instance Herrmann 2005 or Margisson, Sisson and 
Arrowsmith 2003 who observe that simultaneously decentralization- as well as Europeanization processes 
occur).  
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since the introduction of the European Central Banks moved monetary policy to a higher 
layer.  
 
However a substantial tension accrues out of this discussion. While the argument of 
competition and trade is central to the original Calmfors-Driffill argument within a national 
framework its implications are transferred undisputedly to the transnational level by the 
transnational Calmfors-Driffil hypothesis. Hereby a substantial discussion of the implications 
of international competition on wage bargaining and wage growth is tacitly avoided. This 
however is problematic since the only reason why a hump emerges in the case of the 
transnational Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis is the (implicit) assumption that the cross price 
elasticities between the industries between nations are comparably small to the cross price 
elasticities between different industries within a nation. However, while the assumption of 
close-to-zero cross price elasticities arguably this assumption might be reasonable on a 
national level it is heroic for the international level. If, though, this assumption does not hold 
competitive considerations should put a break on overly excessive wage claims and should 
potentially render national wage bargainers in a prisoners’ dilemma situation (comparable to 
that in which firm-based unions are in the case of low bargaining coordination within a 
nation) even if isolated national coordination prevailed.  
 
This argument appears to be perfectly compatible (Traxler 2009) with the second stream of 
thought –here labelled as transnational wage leader hypothesis – which maintains that the 
introduction of the EMU even might have led to the aggregation of wage bargaining to the 
European level. The basic argument is that a(n implicit) system of Pattern Bargaining with 
Germany as the pattern setting country might have emerged. The implications of this for 
appropriate levels of wage growth however are analytically unclear. Soskice and Iversen 
(2001) maintain that after the introduction of the EMU Germany has lost every incentive to 
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exert wage restraint. An opposing position is taken by Dullien (2004) whose – Stackleberg-
framed – argument is that Germany, being a wage leader, can be competitively exploited by 
its followers. In a Keynesian setting in which wage increases stimulate growth (Stockhammer 
et al. 2009) it is argued that a German-led prisoner’s dilemma for European wage bargainers 
has emerged (Chaloupek 2009). The argument that Germany is potentially exploited by 
followers however is disputed by Traxler et al. (2008) on empirical grounds based on 
evidence for the German and Austrian metal sector. Together with Traxler and Brandl (2009) 
this study maintains that Germany has become a traditional pattern setter and internalizes 
potential negative externalities. The view, that the metal industry is central as a pioneer of 
European wage coordination again is shared by Schulten (2002).  
 
Whatever the exact theoretical rationale – with the exception of the path-breaking 
contributions of Traxler et al. (2008) and Traxler and Brandls (2009) who however focus on 
the metal industry in Austria and the Nordic countries – the transnational wage leader 
hypothesis remains empirically under-evaluated. If this hypothesis was correct we should be 
able to find a strong convergence of European wage growth and an overwhelming importance 
of Germany in that process. Whether this actually has occurred is investigated in the 
remainder of this study.  
 
The convergence of wage growth in the EMU-area: Literature Survey 
 
Before moving to the econometric part this section provides a brief overview over the 
empirical picture of wage convergence that is provided by the literature thus far. Pichelmann 
(2001) was the first study to investigate whether wage convergence is taking place. He 
examines the state of the convergence by calculating cross-country correlation coefficients for 
nominal wages and nominal unit labour costs (NULC) for two sub-periods ranging from 
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1970-1985 and from 1986-1999 respectively. While finding that some countries face the risk 
to depart from the overall development he generally finds a tendency towards stronger 
nominal and real wage convergence which is mainly triggered by a core group of EU-11 
countries. Further he finds and a strong correlation of general wage developments with 
Germany during the second period of observation.  
 
Similar evidence has been found by the European Commission (2003). This study investigates 
cross-country coordination on a sectoral level by calculating correlation coefficients and by 
estimating regressions for selected sectors in selected countries (e.g. textile sector in Italy or 
fabricated metal sector in Belgium) for the period of 1981-2001. They find significant 
correlation for a larger number of pairs (between 0.2 and 0.3) in some – especially traded – 
sectors. However, they conclude that convergence was even stronger in the 1980ies than in 
the 1990ies. 
 
Mora et al. (2005) test the degree of convergence of wages and productivity in the Euro-area 
countries. For this purpose they use a data sample from the OECD economic outlook and 
OECD national accounts. They estimate the β-convergence of unit labour costs, nominal 
wages, real wages and labour productivity using cross-section and panel data for the period of 
from 1980-2001. They find robust evidence for the convergence of unit labour cost, nominal 
wages, and labour productivity. Real wages however converge less strongly. The implication 
is that higher inflation in poorer and less developed economies fuels the development of unit 
labour costs. 
 
Arpaia and Pichelmann (2008) estimate FGLS (feasible generalized least squares) estimators 
for the responsiveness of aggregate wage and unit labour cost growth to productivity, 
unemployment and the output gap for a cross-country pool of 12 euro-area members for the 
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period 1980-2005 using AMECO data. They find a significant degree of nominal wage 
rigidity with regard to inflation and a strong influence of unemployment and productivity. 
However, they also find significant cross-country heterogeneity and asymmetric adjustments 
to shocks so their findings indicate that convergence is far from being complete in EMU.  
 
To our best knowledge the only surveys that explicitly tests the pattern bargaining hypotheses 
econometrically are by Traxler et al. (2008) and Traxler and Brandl (2009). Traxler et al. 
(2008) test the effectiveness of coordination within the metal industry and to test whether 
coordination might only be achieved by an ‘exploitation of the great by the small’ by 
estimating the impact of German wage increases in the metal industry on wage increases in 
Austrian wages for two distinct sub-periods. While the first sub-period from 1969/70 to 
1979/80 shows no significant results, the second sub-period 1980/81 to 2002/03 shows a 
significant degree of coordination (based on parallel wage movements) amongst the two 
sectors. However, the hypothesis of the exploitation of the great by the small is rejected as 
wage increases in the Austrian metal industry on average are 1.28 higher than those in the 
German metal industry. Traxler and Brandl (2009) on the other hand focus on the impact of 
the German metal industry on Nordic countries. They find a statistically and economically 
significant influence of German standard pay and actual on Nordic standard and actual pay.  
 
Dullien and Fritsche (2008) take an alternate approach and investigate whether divergences of 
relative nominal unit labour have to be judged as being “harmful”. Harmful divergences are 
defined as divergences bigger than those experienced in historical precedents of what they 
appear to consider as natural experiments of successful currency unions, namely unified 
Germany and the US. They find the development of relative nominal unit labour costs to be 
well in line for most members of the European Currency Union, except for Portugal and 
Spain.  
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Summing up we can map out the following table of empirical contributions.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 
Data Coverage 
 
We use sectoral data for output, employment, compensation and capital from EU KLEMS. 
This data starts in 1970 and ranges to 2005. For bilateral trade we use data from the OECD 
STAN Bilateral Trade Database that provides bilateral sectoral import and export data. Time 
series here range from 1988 to 2004 a period that due to our choice of the key independent 
variable (see below) limits our scope of investigation. Macroeconomic control variables are 
taken from the OECD Economic outlook. The countries covered are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. There is 
no data on bilateral imports for Luxembourg so this country is excluded from the analysis. 
Due to data availability (the longest range being 1988-2004) the analysis is restrained to a 
single period. For economic reasons the starting point is 1992, the year of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The key sectors observed are the manufacturing sectors defined by the ISIC 
classification system from 15 to 45. For these data on the one and a half digit level is available 
which leads to 14 available sectors. Outlier analysis showed that certain attention should be 
paid to small sectors. Particularly problematic is sector 30 (Office, accounting and computing 
machinery) where wages decline by more than 40% in two successive years in France. This is 
untenable by any realistic economic reasoning and is due to the use of different statistical 
sources by disaggregation. In general data still should be reliable but particular attention 
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should be paid to smaller sectors where disaggregation problems tend to be larger.4 This 
information combined with the inspection of the residuals leads us to use Heteroscedasticity-
consitent estimation methods throughout the econometric analysis. Since sector 30 is extreme, 
relatively small but in some cases has substantial power we choose to exclude it from the 
sample which reduces the size of it to 13 sectors (the entire manufacturing sector) over 14 (the 
period from 1992 to 2005) years for most countries. Except for the case of France results 
nonetheless prove to be robust to the exclusion of this sector. Austrian trade data only starts in 
1995 reducing available years here to 10. This also is the case for sectors 30-33 in Italy and 
Finland reducing the sample of available sectors here to 10. 5
 
 Union density on the other hand 
restricts the Portuguese sample to 2004 and CPI data only starts in 1992 in Spain.  
Estimation Method and the construction of the Key Independent Variable 
 
Given the specific structure of the sample it is advisable to use fixed effects to account for 
sectoral peculiarities. However, heteroscedasticity is a problem and OLS cannot be readily 
applied. Consequently we resort to the use of the fixed effects GLS (FEGLS) model with the 
(cross-section) fixed effects being considered to account for sectoral peculiarities and the GLS 
accounting for heteroscedastic disturbances. It can be noted however that the major results are 
robust as well to the use of OLS estimators with White Heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors and covariances instead of an FEGLS estimator.  
                                                 
4 Private correspondence with Mary O'Mahony 26.11.2009. 
5 This only is the case unilaterally. This means no trade data is available e.g. for Austria with Portugal before 
1995 but the mirror statistic – that is data for trade between Portugal and Austria – for this period is available. 
This appears to imply that the statistical authorities – in this case – of Portugal provide data for this period but 
not the Austrian authorities. Unfortunately for years where data is commonly available significant divergences 
between say Exports from Portugal to Austria (the “longer” Portuguese time series) and  its mirror statistic – that 
is Imports to Austria from Portugal (the “shorter” Austrian time series) – prevail. This is due to the fact that the 
export valuation is notated in FOB values while the import valuation includes insurance and freight costs and 
thus is valued CIF (private correspondence with Agnès Cimper from the OECD, 2.12.2009). Consequently it is 
impossible to substitute missing values in one series by its mirror statistics. The same applies to the missing 
sectors in Italy and Finland. However, with reference to our key independent variable (see below) this means that 
there is no missing data from the partners’ point of view.  
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The main interest of this study is to investigate the effects of competitive forces within the 
EMU on the convergence of wage growth and unit labour costs. A direct test of the influence 
of German wage growth would be desirable but such a test is not readily available for 
econometric reasons. In detail, when testing for the influence of German wage growth on the 
growth of wages amongst other EMU-members coefficients might be exaggerated or wrong 
due to a omitted variable bias caused by the possibility of multiple (or different) wage-
leaders.6
 
 Consider for instance the case of Belgium where next (or alternatively) to German 
wage growth a strong influence might be exerted by the growth of wages in France. Using the 
wage growth of more than one country as dependent variables to control for this potential 
effect leads to a major problem. Theoretically an endogeneity problem arises since it is 
possible (but by no means inevitable) that there might be a direct effect on say Belgium from 
two countries of which one again might be have wage growth dependent on the second 
country. Econometrically this problem materializes as a major multicollinearity issue which is 
strong enough to invert the coefficient of respective wage growth variables. In order to 
overcome this problem a special variable of Peer-Wages and Peer-Unit Labour Costs is 
constructed using bilateral trade openness as a weighting factor. The investigation of this 
variable is one of the major contributions of this paper. The variable is defined as follows: 
u
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=∑ ≠ ←→   with 1=+
+∑ ≠ ←→
k
vu
vv
uvuv
MX
mx  
 
With  denoting bilateral exports from country v to country u,  denoting imports to 
country v from country u.  are aggregate exports from country v to the EMU and  are 
                                                 
6 A direct test might be advisable in a case where regional path dependencies, geography and anecdotal evidence 
supports the assumption that Germany figures effectively as an important reference point. However this certainly 
is not a feasible path for the entire manufacturing sector all over the EMU-members countries. 
12 
 
aggregate imports from the EMU to country v. k is the total number of countries other than v 
and in our sample is 11 due to the lack of Luxembourg-data. I is an index denoting time and j 
is an index denoting sectors. v is an index for the respective countries. WPH stands for wages 
per hours. The sum of the fraction aggregates to one which has the nice property that the 
weighting factors deliver a readily comparable variable. Put differently the above exercise 
produces a variable that might be referred to as the wages per hour of the most important 
trading partners (weighted with their respective interrelatedness to the observed country). As a 
short-hand we will talk about Peer-Wages in the following. Analogously, using NULC for 
Unit Labour Costs, Peer-Unit Labour Costs are derived by: 
 
u
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k
vu
vv
uvuvPeer
ji NULCMX
mxNULC ,, ×+
+
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vv
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Of course the construction of this variable does not entirely come without sacrifice. It delivers 
a readily interpretable variable based on trade and competitiveness considerations but to 
construct it the rather strong assumption of a linear relationship between a country’s absolute 
trade position and the wage spill-overs emerging from it has to be imposed. Nonetheless we 
are convinced that these disadvantages are far less important than those associated with any 
other method.  
 
Stylized Facts 
 
Before moving to the results of the estimations we want to provide a brief overview over the 
stylized facts of wage and unit labour cost developments in the EMU-member states over the 
last decades. To make things easily tractable we have generated two groups of countries, the 
one referred to as Core includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
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while the second group, which is referred to as Fringe includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain. The choice of the groups might seem somewhat arbitrary but is made on 
geographical grounds and is informed by the subsequent econometric analysis7
 
. In order to 
wipe out business cycle effects 10-year moving averages are used. Comparing the two groups 
reveals the following picture. In general it was possible to observe a substantial moderation of 
wage growth during of monetary integration observed here. While, of course there are 
differences within the respective groups, the growth rates of the Fringe – while on average 
still being 50% higher than those of the Core – have been reduced substantially stronger than 
those of the Core.  
< INSERT GRAPH 1 HERE> 
 
It is interesting to observe that the substantial moderation of wages in the Fringe did not result 
in a comparably clear picture with regard to the development of NULC-growth. To the 
contrary after a substantial reduction around the early 1980ies they started to grow again 
around the early 1990ies with stronger growth rates in the fringe than in the core. During the 
early 2000s however the two regions started to diverge even more strongly. In particular while 
average NULC-growth of the Core has become ever more slowly during the last years of the 
observation period NULC-growth in the Fringe was substantially rising over the last years. 
This is a strange result since the gap in nominal wage growth narrowed constantly.  
 
< INSERT GRAPH 2 HERE> 
 
                                                 
7 To be sure Belgium does not closely belong to the core group constituted by NULC spill-overs. However, the 
development of the NULC and wage growth rates is thoroughly in line with those of the core group and the 
result that NULC-growth in Belgium does not react on NULC-growth abroad is one of the few not totally robust 
results of the analysis below. 
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The Interdependence of European Wage Growth: Evidence of Competition-led Wage 
Bargains 
 
In this section the effect of the growth of Peer-Wages on the growth of national wages or to 
be more precise the impact of the relation of national to Peer-Wages will be tested. To do this 
the following regression is estimated for each of the eleven observed countries separately.  
 
jipeer
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Hereby CPI∆  is the change of the consumer price index which is thought to control for 
inflationary pressure on wage accords. UD is union density to control for the bargaining 
power of workers. UR∆  is the change of the unemployment rate to control for business cycle 
effect. Dlog(PROD) is productivity growth. peer
ji
v
ji
WPH
WPH
1,
1,
−
−  is the lagged ratio of national 
over Peer Wages.8 CPI∆  and UD are expected to have a positive sign since both, inflation 
and union density are expected to increase labours‘ wage pressure. A negative sing for UR∆  
is expected since an adverse economic situation increases the firing threat which induces 
wage pressure. peer
ji
v
ji
WPH
WPH
1,
1,
−
−  finally controls for the effect of the relative position of 
national wages per hour to peer-wages per hour. This is the key variable which controls if 
wage-competition is important. If a deterioration of the national wage position compared to 
that of the most important partners is relevant a negative sign is expected.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
                                                 
8 Conceptional endogeneity problems prevent the use of contemporary variables here since this would imply that 
contemporary national wage growth would appear as an independent variable in 10 out of the 11 regressions 
while being the dependent variable in one regression. The variable has been tested directly as well but the ratio 
appears to be the relevant variable in this respect. 
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Our key independent variable peer
ji
v
ji
WPH
WPH
1,
1,
−
−  is statistically and (to varying degrees) 
economically significant in all observed countries. These results indicate that over the 
observed period a strong influence on national wage growth has been exerted by the relation 
between national and Peer-Wages. Consequently it is possible to say that considerations about 
the competitiveness of the domestic labour market have become important in national wage 
bargains within the EMU irrespective of the specific for of the national wage bargaining 
system. It even might be possible to characterise the European wage bargaining structure as 
being competition-led.9
CPI∆
 The results for most of the control variable show the expected signs. 
An exception is  which is negative in Austria, Belgium and Spain but is economically 
insignificant in Spain and not overly important in the former countries. UD also is negative in 
several countries but hardly ever is economically significant.10 UR∆ In the two cases where  
turns positive (Finland and Ireland) the economic significance is negligible.  
 
This result is contradictory to the transnational Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis according to 
which competitive considerations only play an important role if wage bargaining takes place 
at the firm level (which hardly anywhere is the case in the EMU). However, it is not 
necessarily a strong contradiction to the transnational wage leader hypothesis which assigns 
an important role to Germany. To demonstrate this we distil the individual effects of the 
respective countries. This is done by recalculating the effects by weighing the coefficients of 
the respective countries with the average country share in bilateral trade of each other country 
                                                 
9 Note that we deliberately use the term competition-led instead of competition-dominated in order to point at the 
fact that considerations concerning competition and trade are very important but by no means exclusive forces 
that influence wage growth.  
10 Particularly in the (statistically non-significant) cases of Belgium and Finland the unexpected sign might be 
due to the fact that these countries belong to the Ghent System where unemployment compensation is organized 
around union membership and where for this union density and unemployment rates probably correlate to 
strongly to use union density as a proxy for bargaining power (Stockhammer 2009). However, it should be noted 
that the major results turn out to be robust to the usage of unemployment instead of union density.  
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( ) and by calculating the effect that a one percent reduction in growth 
of a country would have had on the wage growth of other countries on average over the 
observed period. Of course this only delivers a rough estimate since – as already stated – our 
above analysis is based on the assumption of a linear effect of the absolute size of foreign 
trade on wage growth spill overs. It might be argued that the more important a country’s trade 
position becomes the more strongly its wages will be implemented into national wage 
accords. Econometrically this would imply a different weighting factor such as the squares of 
bilateral trade openness but this would render the coefficient hardly interpretable. Using our 
approach on the other hand delivers readily interpretable coefficients but – if the above 
argument applies – tends to underestimate the economic effects of large countries while 
overestimating the effect of smaller countries. Nonetheless we are able to give a relational 
picture of the influence of each individual country.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
As can be seen from table 2 Germany has had by far the strongest influence on national wage 
growth of EMU-member-states. Its influence is almost twice as large as that of the next 
important countries (France and Italy) implying that on average more than 10% of a 1 percent 
reduction in German wage growth are passed though to other EMU-members. This might not 
appear to be a very large effect on first inspection but the reader should be aware that this 
effect is still substantially larger than the effect observed for national inflation, union density 
or the unemployment rate. Only productivity developments overreach the importance of 
Germany as an influential factor of wage growth. Further as we have argued – there exists a 
strong likelihood that – these percentages even underestimate the leading role of Germany. 
Consequently the analysis puts us into a position where we can identify Germany as a key 
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player in transnational wage bargaining. Given the lag structure of our analysis it is not too 
exaggerated to argue that German wage bargains to some extent lead wage bargains its 
fellow-EMU-members.  
 
Of course the fact that wage bargainers tied national wage accords (irresepective whether this 
has been done implicitly or explicitly) to the development of wages of their most important 
trading partners implicates that this has been done in an effort to link productivity growth to 
competitors. Consequently a strong connection of wages leads to the expectation of a strong 
connection of unit labour costs. But has this actually been achieved in reality? 
 
Unit Labour Cost Developments in the EMU and the competitive position of individual 
countries 
 
This section investigates the development of nominal unit labour costs (NULC) in the EMU 
since their development is the ultimate aim of national wage policies. To do this the following 
regression is estimated for each of the observed countries:  
 
ji
peer
ji
v
ji
v
j
v
j
v
ji ULCdEMPdUDCPINULCd ,1,6,5321, )log()log()log( εβββββ +++++∆+= −  
 
Variables are defined as above with the same expected signs. Instead of UR∆ , EMP – the 
number of hours worked – is used since this also accounts for different sectoral effects of 
business cycles.11  are Peer-NULC. The model that works best in the case of NULC is 
the one described above. This means that the inclusion of the variable directly and not as ratio 
                                                 
11 Since the independent variable is constructed by using EMP it is not used in the wage regression.  
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appears to be the better model in the case of unit labour costs. The results can be seen in table 
2.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
The most interesting countries for our purposes are the group composed of Austria, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands which are bold. Here,  turns statistically and 
economically significant. This again reflects the impression that already emerged from the 
stylized facts discussed above. With the notable exception of Belgium, the group define as 
core above displays an increasing interdependence of their NULC developments. Again there 
is an unexpected result of CPI∆  for the case of Austria and Portugal. This for Austria again 
is the case for UD as well which however is not economically significant. All other control 
variables either show the expected sign or are statistically insignificant.  
 
Robustness  
As occasionally indicated the above analysis underwent a series of robustness tests. In 
particular the structure of control variables has been modified also accounting for changes in 
the stock of capital and ICT-capital and subtracting individual control variables. The sectoral 
sample has been aggregated to the one digit level to wipe out potential effects of small 
sectors. Dummies have been added for the EMU-crises (1992) and for the introduction of the 
Euro as book currencies (1999) and as legal tender (2002). Also different estimators have 
been used such as white heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and covariances.  
 
In Belgium and Portugal Peer-Nulc become significant when including a dummy for 2002 
with a significant time dummy but signs turn out to be negative. This is counterintuitive since 
the introduction of the Euro might have led to upward price pressure in some highly 
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competitive markets with a low price elasticity of demand (with the introduction of Euro-
curreny being considered to have resolved a strategic prisoner’s dilemma on these markets, 
De Grauwe 2009). This however rather should have increased NULC through increased wage 
pressure. Further a stronger sectoral aggregation has slight effects on statistical significance 
but notably not on the economic intuition of the results. Capital stock growth remained 
surprisingly insignificant in most observed countries. Apart from these rather negligible 
effects all results are robust statistically and economically to all of the mentioned estimation 
variations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed the interdependence of European wage and unit labour cost growth. It 
has been ascertained that a strong interdependence of wage growth within the EMU exists. 
The growth of German wages hereby plays a leading role and is – aside from productivity-
growth – by far the most important influence on European wage growth. This provides 
additional empirical support for the transnational wage leader hypothesis as proposed by 
Traxler et al. (2008). However, the interdependence identified above is due to competitive 
effects and is based on trade considerations. It still is possible that the convergence of wages 
is actually due to a prisoners’ dilemma situation for wage bargainers in which strong wage 
increases are prevented by the fear that this could provide a basis for competitors to bid away 
market shares. Put differently while German wage restraint might be passed on this does not 
necessarily imply that German wage hikes would be passed on as well.  
 
This view is supported by the second key result of this survey. The strong spill-overs of wage 
growth that where identified did not fully materialize in the form of NULC spill-overs. That 
is, wages have become increasingly interdependent but with regard to NULC a group – 
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composed of Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and France – exists where interrelations 
already exist. The NULC-growth of other countries however has been largely independent of 
the development of NULC-growth abroad, despite the fact that we have been able to identify 
– partly very strong – connections to wage growth abroad that the spill-overs of wage 
moderation might have been even too small. It is unlikely that the difference between the 
fringe and the core reflects a healthy readjustment process (since this was to imply that the 
core-countries needed to correct for competitive disadvantages compared to the fringe). If this 
argument holds true, the danger of a replication of the East German deindustrialisation 
experience is imminent for the fringe of the EMU implying far stronger centrifugal forces for 
the second decade of the EMU than for the first. If however wage policy of the fringe alone 
was to narrow the gap this would first require a detachment of German wage policies and 
second close to zero growth rates of wages leading to a deflationary scenario for the EMU (in 
particular when accounting for reactions of the core). It might be less painful altogether to 
allow for higher wage growth in the core to open up room for readjustments. This however 
would require a more explicit set of European wage coordination as proposed by Schulten 
(2002). 
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Tables and Graphs: 
Table 1 
State of the Field: Empirics 
Source Countries, 
Aggregation 
and Year 
Variable Method Key Finding 
Pichelmann 
(2001) 
EU-Members, 
Aggregate Data, 
1970-1999 
Nominal Wages 
Growth and Nominal 
Unit Labour Cost 
Growth 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Convergence for all 
observed variables 
European 
Commission 
(2003) 
EU-Members, 
Sectoral Data, 
Selected Sectoral 
Case Studies, 1981-
2001 
Nominal Wages 
Levels and Nominal 
Unit Labour Cost 
Levels 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Convergence for all 
observed variables 
Mora et al. 
(2005) 
EMU-Members, 
Aggregate Data, 
1980-2001 
Levels of Unit 
Labour Costs, 
Nominal and Real 
Wages  
β-convergence Convergence of 
Wages and Nominal 
Unit Labour Costs 
Arpaia and 
Pichelmann 
(2007) 
EMU-Members, 
Aggregate Data, 
1980-2005 
Nominal wage and 
Unit Labour Costs 
Growth 
Indirect test of the 
responsiveness to key 
variables using 
Feasible LS 
Significant 
Difference in Wage 
Formation 
Traxler et al. 
(2008) 
Austrian and 
German Metal 
Sector, 1970-2003 
Nominal Wage 
Growth 
OLS German Leadership 
Traxler and 
Brandl 
(2009) 
Nordic and German 
Metal Sector 1973-
2004 
Nominal Wage 
Growth 
OLS German Leadership 
Dullien and 
Fritsche 
(2008) 
EMU-Members, 
Aggregate Data 
Relative nominal 
Unit Labour Costs 
Comparison Convergence for a 
core 
Table 1 
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Table 1 
The effects of Peer-Wages on National Wages 
 
The dependent variable is the lagged percentage change of national wages per hour (∆WPH). C is the intercept, ∆(CPI) the change of the CPI, UD is union density. D(UR) is the change of the 
unemployment rate. ∆ WPH(T-1)/WPHPeer(T-1) is the lagged ratio of national over Peer-Wages. T-values are in parentheses. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% 
level.  
 
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN 
 
Periods 10 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 
Sections 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 10 13 13 13 
Observations 130 170 182 182 182 182 182 140 182 157 169 
 
C 
0.211*** 
(4.286) 
0.374*** 
(5.187) 
0.129** 
(1.988) 
0034 
(0.665) 
0.031 
(0.794) 
0.921*** 
(9.530) 
0.312*** 
(4.172) 
0.176** 
(2.223) 
0.195*** 
(3.611) 
0.362*** 
(3.240) 
0.346*** 
(5.341) 
D(CPI) 
-0.024*** 
(-8.631) 
-0.014** 
(-2.514) 
0.002 
(1.236) 
0.006 
(1.153) 
0.003 
(0.626) 
0.008 
(1.095) 
0.011*** 
(2.839) 
0.004 
(1.351) 
0.006*** 
(2.895) 
0.014*** 
(3.763) 
-0.008** 
(-2.432) 
UD 
-0.002** 
(-2.138) 
-0.001 
(-0.794) 
-0.001 
(-0.935) 
0.012*** 
(3.638) 
0.005*** 
(7.237) 
-0.017*** 
(-6.183) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.977) 
-0.001 
(-0.397) 
-0.003** 
(-2.131) 
-0.007** 
(-2.002) 
-
0.009*** 
(-3.226) 
D(UR) 
-0.019*** 
(-5.617) 
0.008*** 
(2.768) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.759) 
-0.002 
(-0.560) 
-0.003 
(-0.646) 
-0.002133 
(-0.244) 
-0.009** 
(-2.593) 
-0.011** 
(-2.464) 
0.007*** 
(3.012) 
-0.027*** 
(-6.091) 
0.005*** 
(3.063) 
DLOG(PROD) 
1.996*** 
(6.856) 
0.189 
(1.192) 
0.536*** 
(4.816) 
0.302* 
(1.888) 
0.079 
(0.342) 
0.718*** 
(3.807) 
-0.078 
(-0.654) 
0.681*** 
(4.775) 
-0.033 
(-0.273) 
0.483** 
(2.471) 
0.517*** 
(4.368) 
WPH(T-
1)/WPHPeer(T-1) 
-0.100*** 
(-2.808) 
-0.231*** 
(-6.764) 
-0.061** 
(-2.060) 
-0.109*** 
(-2.631) 
-0.117*** 
(-3.928) 
-1.308*** 
(-9.707) 
-0.322*** 
(-4.010) 
-
0.190*** 
(-2.796) 
-0.102*** 
(-3.121) 
-0.596*** 
(-4.354) 
-
0.201*** 
(-3.355) 
 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 R-squared 0.593 0.413 0.242 0.184 0.544 0.580 0.263 0.523 0.271 0.515 0.441 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.531 0.347 0.163 0.100 0.497 0.536 0.187 0.470 0.195 0.456 0.378 
F-statistic 9.598*** 6.285*** 3.078*** 2.180*** 11.531*** 13.306*** 3.444*** 9.797*** 3.583*** 8.684*** 7.001*** 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 1.947 2.079 2.560 1.986 2.074 2.046 2.603 2.456 1.934 2.257 2.033 
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Table 2 
The size of the spill-overs of a 1% reduction in national wage growth on other countries 
 
Effected Country 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Effecting 
Country  
Austria 
 
-0.232% -0.065% -0.517% -4.502% -0.039% -0.067% -0.921% -0.325% -0.055% -0.222% 
Belgium -0.319% 
 
-0.201% -5.778% -7.067% -0.140% -0.590% -1.774% -4.864% -0.257% -0.946% 
Finland 
           France -0.240% -1.908% -0.112% 
 
-4.136% -0.120% -0.274% -2.256% -1.057% -0.303% -1.757% 
Germany -1.263% -1.535% -0.277% -2.852% 
 
-0.158% -0.294% -1.973% -1.788% -0.266% -0.909% 
Greece -3.009% -9.068% -0.410% -19.531% -46.116% 
 
-2.022% -40.014% -14.789% -1.079% -9.032% 
Ireland -0.462% -5.194% -0.584% -6.796% -10.655% -0.315% 
 
-3.367% -5.218% -0.395% -2.022% 
Italy -0.924% -1.530% -0.198% -4.933% -7.087% -0.503% -0.318% 
 
-1.647% -0.368% -1.958% 
Nether-
lands -0.156% -1.677% -0.136% -1.210% -3.261% -0.078% -0.170% -0.656% 
 
-0.100% -0.359% 
Portugal -1.156% -5.760% -0.726% -16.851% -23.376% -0.357% -0.807% -9.128% -6.789% 
 
-28.467% 
Spain -0.489% -1.672% -0.142% -9.086% -7.605% -0.288% -0.458% -4.912% -1.795% -2.772% 
  Average 
Effect on 
Other 
EMU-
Members -0.891% -3.543% -0.310% -8.380% -13.663% -0.245% -0.617% -8.010% -4.743% -0.693% -5.681% 
Percentages imply that during the observed period a X% of a 1% reduction in wage growth are passed on to other countries on average. The calculation is based the recalculation of the key 
independent variables using average weighting factors and coefficients.  
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Table 2 
 
The effects of peer unit labour costs on national unit labour costs 
 
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN 
 
Period 10 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 
Cross-
sections 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 10 13 13 13 
Observations 130 170 182 182 182 182 182 140 182 157 169 
 
C 
0.114*** 
(3.401) 
0.082 
(1.076) 
0.101 
(1.189) 
-0.083** 
(-2.513) 
-0.109*** 
(-6.662) 
0.084 
(1.218) 
0.119*** 
(2.611) 
0.014 
(0.320) 
-0.048 
(-1.637) 
-0.105** 
(-3.047) 
0.029 
(0.644) 
∆(CPI) 
-0.013*** 
(-4.542) 
-0.018*** 
(-3.329) 
0.004 
(0.851) 
-0.007 
(-1.448) 
-0.004 
(-1.332) 
0.004 
(0.427) 
-0.004 
(-0.833) 
0.001 
(0.268) 
0.006** 
(2.474) 
-0.008** 
(-1.902) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.682) 
UDAUT 
-0.002** 
(-2.565) 
-0.001 
(-0.506) 
-0.001 
(-0.966) 
0.013*** 
(3.424) 
0.005*** 
(6.649) 
-0.004 
(-1.022) 
-0.002* 
(-1.836) 
0.000 
(-0.215) 
0.002* 
(1.960) 
0.008*** 
(4.296) 
0.001 
(0.424) 
DLOG(EMP) 
0.601*** 
(8.687) 
0.729*** 
(7.436) 
0.709*** 
(12.589) 
0.343*** 
(3.154) 
0.688*** 
(10.572) 
0.693*** 
(5.993) 
0.533*** 
(6.902) 
0.652*** 
(7.564) 
0.719*** 
(17.277) 
0.433*** 
(3.521) 
0.599*** 
(11.579) 
∆NULCPeer 
(T-1) 
0.190*** 
(3.147) 
0.066 
(0.580) 
-0.220 
(-1.326) 
0.190* 
(1.928) 
0.183** 
(2.326) 
-0.339 
(-1.163) 
0.083 
(0.481) 
-0.067 
(-0.654) 
0.156** 
(2.364) 
0.112 
(0.725) 
0.063 
(0.648) 
 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 R-squared 0.763 0.373 0.636 0.458 0.640 0.298 0.451 0.421 0.718 0.303 0.659 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.730 0.308 0.601 0.405 0.606 0.230 0.397 0.361 0.691 0.224 0.624 
F-statistic 22.745*** 5.691*** 18.045*** 8.710*** 18.367*** 4.374*** 8.460*** 7.044*** 26.247*** 3.812*** 18.400*** 
Prob(F-
statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-
Watson stat 2.165 2.079 2.440 1.747 2.119 1.181 2.159 2.518 1.794 2.225 2.180 
The dependent variable is the lagged percentage change of national nominal unit labour costs (∆NULC). C is the intercept, ∆(CPI) the change of the CPI, UD is union density. DLOG(EMP) is 
the percentage change of sectoral employment. ∆NULCPeer (T-1) is the lagged value of peer unit labour costs. T-values are in parentheses. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, the 5% 
and the 1% level.  
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Appendix  
 
ISIC Classification of Sectors 
ISIC Rev. 3 
Description 
15-16 
Food and Tobacco  
17-19 
Textiles, dressing apparel and Leather 
20 
Wood and Cork 
21-22 
Paper, Paper Products and Printing 
23-25 
Coke, Chemicals and Rubber 
26 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
27-28 
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 
29 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c 
30 
Office machinery 
31 
Electrical Machinery n.e.c 
32 
Radio, TV and Communication equipment 
33 
Medical and Optical instruments 
34-35 
Motor vehicels and Transport Equipment 
36-37 
Recyling and Manufacturing n.e.c 
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